The People’s Government and the Kim Daejung Administration[1]
(1) Background
The Kim Daejung administration, known as the “People’s Government,” was the first government led by an opposition-party leader who was elected to the presidency based on a peaceful transition of power. No one could doubt the legitimacy and authority of this first truly democratic government of South Korea. Nevertheless, the new administration faced a series of dire threats at home and abroad, amid the currents of globalization, an increasingly open international economy, and the march of informatization. Most importantly, the Foreign Exchange Crisis that swept across Asia in the late 1990s seriously challenged the functioning of the newly elected government. The economic and financial crisis unfolding in Korea amplified the demand for small government and deregulation.
It must be remarked that the economic crisis that embroiled Korea at the time the Kim Daejung administration came to power had little to do with fiscal deficits. The Korean government had maintained a relatively balanced account until the outbreak of the financial crisis, nor was its size too big or costly. Nevertheless, the financial crisis provided the impetus for introducing more radical and active reform measures molded after the new public management theory. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in exchange for providing the capital Korea desperately needed, requested that the Korean government undertake a series of liberal reform measures. The World Bank and other international organizations also strongly pressed for reform. The “People’s Government,” ironically, was therefore forced to endorse neoliberal reforms in contradiction to the market reality and public sentiment in Korea.
(2) Purposes of Reforms
The overarching aims of the “People’s Government” were advancing democracy while simultaneously developing the market economy. President Kim Daejung, in his inauguration address, promised to achieve five central objectives through his administration, namely, reconciliation-based politics, democratic economic development, an autonomous civil society, a comprehensive defense system, and a creative national culture.
(3) Main Actors and Means
Unlike its predecessors that attempted partial and limited reforms by establishing various provisional committees as seemingly required, the People’s Government set out to create a full-fledged, standing governmental body specialized in public reforms. The new organization started out as the Budget Planning Committee (BPC), and was later expanded and reorganized into the Department of Budget Planning. A separate organization, named the Governmental Innovation Committee (GIC), was also launched to enforce government-wide reforms.
The BPC was unlike the civilian advisory board seen under the earlier Kim administration. Rather, the BPC reported directly to the President as a full administrative unit in its own right (Choi, 1998). The BPC was a result of the first organizational reform devised by the Transition Committee that came into being prior to President Kim Daejung’s inauguration. While the Transition Committee at first considered endowing the BPC with the authority to prepare budgets, that authority eventually remained with the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE), with the BPC specializing solely in public sector reform. The BPC nonetheless wielded sizable influence over budgets through developing basic budget guidelines.
At its outset, the BPC was regarded as quite innovative and reformatory in nature. A considerable number of its members were consultants, accountants, lawyers, and researchers drawn from the private sector, and BPC employees received performance and contribution-based salaries. Contrary to other governmental bodies, the BPC, like private-sector businesses, was comprised of teams specializing in different projects (Choi, 1998).
In the meantime, the Department of Budget (DoB), which was part of the MFE until then, merged with the BPC after a Cabinet decision to that effect. As a result of this merger, the BPC now had some power over the budget making process, and evolved from a mere presidential council into a central administrative agency in its own right. This change in status, however, meant that the DoB’s public reforms and their effects were limited to ministries and departments only, and thus were not felt by the public or included in the President’s policy agenda.
Moreover, the DoB had to cope with the new need for cooperation and coordination with other ministries and departments, while being aware of its limited power to shape pan-governmental reform.[2] When the DoB was still the BPC, the Chairman sought the advice of the Administrative Reform Committee, which was comprised of 20 or so members.[3] The DoB eventually absorbed the ARC as well, and was reborn as the Governmental Innovation Committee (GIC) in August 2000, reporting directly to the President.
The newly created GIC was a public-private partnership, consisting of 10 civilian members drawn from nongovernmental organizations, media, and other sectors of civil society, and seven bureaucrats, including ministers of the DoB, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MGAHA), and the Ministry of Information and Communication. The GIC included a working committee as well as a number of working groups specialized in discerning reform issues in various areas. It was distinct from its predecessor, the ARC, in that it actively sought out civilian participation. It had two special committees, the Inspection and Evaluation Committee and the e-Government Committee. The former possessed two evaluation task forces, one that reviewed the progress of innovation at ministries and departments, and the other the status of management at public corporations.
Aside from these bodies, the Kim administration created a host of other agencies as well for effective reform of the public sector, including the Central Personnel Committee, the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC), the Decentralization Committee, and others. The Central Personnel Committee, established in February 1999, handled personnel matters in public administration alongside the MGA. The RRC, first placed under the direct supervision by the President in April 1998, had 12 civilian and six government officials as members. Co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a civilian, the RRC engaged in major reform activities, including preparations for drafting and enacting the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations. The Decentralization Committee, placed under the President’s supervision in July 1999, was also co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a civilian, and had 20 members in total.
The Kim administration waged three governmental reforms in total, each time with a different group or organization as the lead agency. The Transition Committee (i.e., the Committee for the Review and Reorganization of the Government) handled the first organizational reform.[4] The second reform was led by the chair of the BPC, who appointed a special coordinator for assessing organizational management. The third reform was led by the MGAHA, with the Minister appointing a special coordinator for correlating governmental functions. These changes in leadership throughout the reform process ultimately compromised the consistency of reform results, with the same units or bodies being abolished and created anew.
The diversity of reform-leading organizations spurred differing perspectives on the Kim administration’s reform efforts. Some assert that the reforms were conducted in a bottom-up manner in the early half of the administration, and in a top-down manner in the latter half. Others argue that the reforms of central administrative agencies in general mostly proceeded in a bottom-up manner (with the reform plans drafted at the bottom level and refined as they went up the hierarchy), while the reforms of central financial agencies took the top-down route (Na, 1999).
The truth is closer to this: the Office of Government Reform, placed within the DoB, led top-down administrative reform based on budgetary logic (Park and Lee, 2003). The Kim administration reviewed and assessed the progress of reform every quarter, and disclosed its findings publicly. The publicized results would then become the basis for drafting the budget. Where the Board of Audit found cases and evidence of negligence and complacency, the accused organization was obligated to plan and implement corrective measures on its own. The DoB would then review the progress of the corrections made, and reflect its findings in budget decisions.
The People’s Government is noteworthy for being the first administration to implement organizational reforms in a public manner. It is also unique for preferring the term “management innovation” to “administrative reform,” the latter being more common parlance at the time.[5] That this drive for “management innovation” was founded in greater trust in the private sector than in the public was evident in the second organizational reform pursued by the government.
The second reform proceeded with the help of a private-sector consulting firm, which deployed 19 assessment teams that reviewed the status of management and administration in nine areas of the government’s activities for four consecutive months. With this, the Kim administration became the first government in history to commission a private-sector firm for the purpose of assessing government performance. The firm worked with a joint team of assessors from various ministries and departments.[6]
Nevertheless, this system of having a private-sector firm assess governmental activities generated greater costs than benefits. The assessment lasted for only four months, despite it costing a total of KRW 4 billion. Moreover, the firm’s independence was not protected against interference by ministries and departments. Warnings of financial disadvantage were issued against assessment teams that allegedly refused to comply with given instructions. Assessment results were reversed and changed, for no apparent or acceptable reason, in reports to the Management Assessment and Coordination Committee. The firm expressed skepticisms about the merits of integrating the BPD with the DoB, but the two bodies were eventually merged nonetheless.[7]
The Kim administration sought to achieve far-reaching reforms, modeled after the new public management theory, in a comprehensive manner encompassing diverse fields and areas of activities. Active debates arose over such issues as privatization, organizational accountability, and deregulation, while numerous new reform measures were implemented. It was the Kim administration that turned, for the first time in history, a reform-specializing governmental unit into a full-fledged governmental agency in its own right.
Yet the reform drive of the Kim administration was not without its critics. Some conclude that the administrative reforms of the era were excessively focused on strengthening the President’s power and downsizing various ministries and departments, and thus failed to bring about substantial changes (Kwon, 1998). Others also point out that the reforms failed to usher in an open recruitment or hiring system, while the number of people working in civil service increased gradually again after a brief period of reduction.
Most importantly, critics questioned whether the new public management theory suited the conditions of Korea at the time. Others argue that the Kim administration appropriated the new public management theory only on the surface, while increasing welfare spending and related policy measures in reality.
Source: Korea Institute of Public Administration. 2008. Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.
4. Participatory Government[1]
(1) Background
The Participatory Government of the Roh Moohyun administration faced at its outset the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States and nuclear threats from North Korea on the external front, and the deepening income divide, rising social conflicts, and rapid increase of delinquent borrowers domestically. Moreover, the new government found itself confronting an alarming level of “trust deficit,”[2] while the imbalance of power between the central government and local ones continued to increase.
(2) Purposes of Reforms
The Transition Committee for the Participatory Government pursued and promoted three main ideals under the Roh administration, namely, achieving “democracy with the people,” “balanced growth and a more equal society for all,” and “an era focused on the promotion of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.” The four main principles required to achieve these ideals were “integrity and trust,” “fairness and transparency,” “conversation and compromise,” and “decentralization and autonomy.” The policy agenda, designed to fulfill the ideals and principles, specified 12 key issues of policymaking to be legislated and implemented. These were: building a peace regime in the Korean peninsula, eliminating corruption and enhancing the services of public administration, promoting decentralization and ensuring more balanced national growth, waging participation- and integration-oriented reforms, establishing a free and fair market order, developing Korea into the economic center of Northeast Asia, realizing a society centered on science and technology, enhancing the future-orientation of rural communities, improving participatory welfare and quality of life, realizing national integration and gender equality, promoting educational reforms and fostering a knowledge-valuing culture, and developing a model of labor relations that promotes social integration (Kim and Park, 2005).
The Participatory Government sought to improve Korea’s competitiveness and the level of people’s life satisfaction. More specifically, it aimed to elevate the level of South Korea’s international competitiveness to such an extent that the country could join the ranks of the 10 strongest economies in the world by 2015. The government also pursued measures and implemented new services to enhance people’s quality of life.[3]
Such reforms were aimed at, in general, making the government more “people-friendly” and proficient at its tasks and services.[4] In particular, the five keywords of the administrative reform drive were “efficient administration,” “servicing administration,” “decentralized administration,” “transparent administration,” and “people-friendly administration.” The Participatory Government accordingly placed greater emphasis on realizing an efficient government over a small government. This reflects a growing weariness and skepticism of the new public management theory and the small-government campaign that dominated the reform drive of the 1990s.[5]
The Participatory Government also pursued increased administrative transparency, with the participation of government employees and the people alike, hoping to bolster trust in the government. In other words, for this administration it was more important for the government to work well than to be smaller in size. There was new focus on the idea that a competent, efficient government served multiple essential functions, and that its ultimate purpose was to gain and raise the people’s trust in its operations.
The Participatory Government arrived at this conclusion by envisioning its role over and beyond the mere pursuit of productivity. The new government started out by raising the fundamental question of what roles a government ought to play, and how. The aims and directions of reforms were determined on the basis of in-depth considerations of the relationships between the state and the market, and between the central government and local government organizations. Policymakers in this administration questioned the value of accepting the (Westernized) call for small government without discernment. They concluded that the crucial functions of the government were providing a social security net and ensuring second chances for failed businesses and individuals. Though the Participatory Government was not hostile to the idea of small government as an instrument of efficiency, its policymakers nevertheless believed that indiscriminate layoffs of government employees could not be the solution to every problem, and that the government needed to maintain or improve crucial services pertaining to social welfare in order to satisfy people’s needs.[6]
At the same time, the Government Innovation and Decentralization Committee (GIDC) defined the 21st-century innovative state as one in which the government, the private sector, and individuals together pursue innovation to establish automated facilities and devices,[7] and where the potential of all members for making an intellectually and culturally powerful state is used to the fullest extent.[8]
(3) Main Actors and Means
The innovation drive system in the Participatory Government consisted of multiple levels.[9] In charge of planning and overseeing the implementation of reforms were the Senior Secretary to the President for Innovation Management, the Government Innovation Headquarters in the MGAHA, the GIDC, the innovation officers (or coordinators) of central ministries and departments, and the innovation and decentralization officers of various local government organizations, all of whom were engaged in constant dialogue with each other. The innovation teams of various ministries, departments, and local government organizations were the basic units of the government-wide reform drive, and were modeled after the innovation labs that were created in various parts of the federal government under the Clinton administration.[10] The Roh administration made great efforts to internalize and perpetuate this multi-level and multi-network system of innovation.
The GIDC was created in April 2003, at the outset of the Participatory Government, and charged with determining the direction and strategy of government innovation and identifying related policy issues. The GIDC replaced the Government Innovation Committee (GIC) and reported directly to the President. The Roh administration created more standing committees than its predecessors. The GIDC released its Strategy and Plan for Implementing Government Reforms in April 2003, and established a roadmap on the reforms to be achieved in various areas, including administration, personnel management, decentralization, finance and taxation, and electronic government.
In December 2003, the position of the Senior Secretary to the President for Innovation Management was newly added whose role it was to oversee and provide comprehensive support for innovation taking place in various ministries and departments. The Administrative Reform Headquarters (ARHQ) was also newly created as part of the MGAHA in March 2003 to help develop a permanent innovation implementing system. In October of the same year, the ARHQ was reorganized into the Government Innovation Headquarters (GIHQ). Ministries and departments appointed innovation officers (now innovation coordinators) in March 2004 to oversee reforms taking place in their midst. Local government organizations followed suit by appointing innovation and decentralization officers in August of that year.
The Innovation Management Committee (IMC) was set up as part of the MGAHA in May 2004 to accelerate government innovation and ensure systematic management of reforms. The window for civil petitions and the office of the Senior Secretary to the President for Institutional Improvement, both part of the Blue House, were merged together into the Office of Innovation Management in December 2004. The position of the Senior Secretary to the President for Innovation Management was created in April 2005.
The Participatory Government indeed saw the burgeoning of organizations and offices focused on promoting and implementing reforms. These bodies were effectively connected via a network of regular working meetings and other such gatherings. Each ministry or department also had its own innovation network consisting of its own subsidiary institutions, affiliated institutions, civilian experts, and so on.[11]
The Participatory Government’s emphasis on systemic and cultural reformation was unprecedented in intensity, frequency, and scope. “Systemic” and “cultural,” however, are quite broad concepts and consequently required the Roh administration to attempt far-reaching, novel reforms. The reform-implementing system of the Roh administration was indeed multi-faceted in its features because the reform drive targeted a wide range of subjects. Direct channels of communication, including instant messaging and presidential letters, were introduced to enable government employees to engage the President in pressing policy concerns. Discussions were regularly and repeatedly held among the ministers, vice ministers, senior officials, and other working-level officials of various central ministries and departments. Informal activities organized by officials, such as junior boards, knowledge clubs, and study forums also played active roles. Saturdays were set aside as “Learning Days” as the five-day workweek system had not yet been established.
The zeal of the Participatory Government for reform, in other words, is unprecedented in Korea and hardly finds a match globally either. The Roh administration actively borrowed from the private sector such advanced management techniques as Six Sigma, Community of Practice (CoP), workout days, action learning, and Balanced Score Cards (BSCs). Accordingly, civilian experts on change management and management innovation also took part in government reforms to an unprecedented extent.
Source: Korea Institute of Public Administration. 2008. Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.
