콘텐츠 바로가기
로그인
컨텐츠
  • HOME
  • SEARCH
PLUS Text Size MINUS RESET
FACEBOOK TWITTER Linked In

Category Open

Resources

tutorial

Collection of research papers and materials on development issues

home

Resources
Economy Economic System

Print

상품시장경쟁과 기업지배구조 관계 연구(Corporate governance of cartel firms) : 카르텔을 중심으로

Related Document
Frame of Image 보상체계는 담합의 용이성과 어떠한 관계가 있는가? 이 러한 질문에 대답하기 위해 본 연구는 한국의 기업 데이터를 새롭게 구 축하여 분석을 실시한다. 이때 특히 경영자와 사외이사 간 사회적 연고 관계의 존재를 파악하고 그러한 존재가 기업지배구조와 담합에 대해 가 지는 함의를 찾는다. 경영자와 사외이사 간 연고관계의 존재는 감독기능이 약한 지배구조로 연결되고, 담합기업의 경우 특히 이러한 취약한 지배구조가 많이 발견되 었다. 이러한 지배구조는 담합의 기간을 늘리는 관계를 보여 담합의 유
발간사
지를 용이하게 함을 암시한다. 한편, 담합기업에서는 경영자의 임기가 경 영자의 산업 대비 성과에 덜 민감한 것으로 나타나 경영자의 노력과 보 상의 연관성이 약함이 발견되었다. 이 또한 담합기업에서 경영자에 대한 감독이 낮은 편임을 암시한다. 종합하면, 담합기업은 비담합기업에 비해 감독기능이 떨어지는 지배구조를 가지고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 저자는 본 연구를 기획하는 단계부터 마무리하는 단계까지 귀중한 조 언을 아끼지 않은 본원의 박사들과 본 연구에서 이용된 통계자료를 구축 하고 정리하는 데에 큰 도움을 준 김홍대 연구원, 노지영 연구원에게 감 사함을 전하고 있다. 마지막으로 본 보고서에 제시된 견해는 집필자 개인의 의견이며, 본원 의 공식 견해가 아님을 밝혀 두는 바이다.
2015년 12월 한국개발연구원 원장
김준경
목차
발간사 요 약 ······························································································································ 1
제1장 서 론················································································································ 제2장 문헌 연구와 가설 설정················································································
3 7
제1절 문헌 연구 ······························································································· 7 제2절 가설 설정 ····························································································· 12
제3장 자료와 기술 통계·························································································
15
제1절 자료 수집과 샘플 구성 ········································································ 15 제2절 변수 설정과 기술 통계 ·························


Full Text
Title 상품시장경쟁과 기업지배구조 관계 연구(Corporate governance of cartel firms)
Similar Titles
Sub Title

카르텔을 중심으로

Material Type Reports
Author(Korean)

이화령

Publisher

세종 : 한국개발연구원

Date 2015-12
Series Title; No 정책연구시리즈 / 2015-06
ISBN 979-11-5932-091-0 (93320)
Pages 103
Subject Country South Korea(Asia and Pacific)
Language Korean
File Type Documents
Original Format pdf
Subject Economy < Economic System
Holding 한국개발연구원; KDI국제정책대학원
License

Abstract

Firm strategies in a product market are determined by management. Therefore product market competition cannot be free from corporate governance which directly affects the decision-making process of management. To examine the relationship between corporate governance and collusion, a unique data set is collected on cartel case details, board composition and activities, and socio-demographic characteristics of outside directors and CEOs in 155 listed companies in South Korea for 2007-2012. We observed more dissenting votes from outside directors in collusive firms than in competitive firms. Not only that casting a dissenting vote raises the risk of being replaced, the risk increase is found to be significantly larger in collusive firms than in other firms. In addition, CEO turnover sensitivity to relative performance is high in competitive firms while such relationship is not found in collusive firms. Rather, the turnover probability goes down with industry performance in collusive firms. These empirical results suggest that collusive firms have weaker governance than competitive firms.