Korea’s regional industries are facing new challenges that encompass a weak knowledge base, unstable industrial base, weak inter-industrial linkages, and stagnating start-up activities and networking, amongst others. Accordingly, this study investigates the structure and characteristics of co-patenting networks in Korea’s Daejeon region using co-patenting data for the 2005-2015 period. Dajeon Metropolitan City is regarded as the center of innovation―after the capital region, including Seoul and neighboring Gyung-gi Province―and is home to leading higher education institutions, such as Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and the majority of government-funded research institutes. Indeed, under this favorable institutional environment, networking is expected to be active and exemplary for other regions. Contrary to expectations, however, co-patenting networks among patent applicants in the Deajeon region are not showing a growing trend. Despite the number of co-patent applicants doubling between 2005 and 2015, from 281 to 590, that of co-patents has remained almost the same, marking 1,201 and 1,194 during the same period. The network itself has become more complex, but the relationship between the actors is static and fragmented. This reveals that there is a stagnation of networking in Korean industries; which is also prevalent in other forms of industrial collaboration. Statistically, co-patenting networks in Daejeon conform well with power law distribution. The co-patenting network can be explained by the preferential attachment model in social network analysis. The estimated values of exponents in power-law fitting range from 1.87 to 2.26, all with statistical significance. The estimation results imply that the network is located between an anomalous network and small-world of power-law networks. The results also hint at the existence of an underlying mechanism blocking the growth of co-patenting networks in the Daejeon region. This study conjectures that the anomaly derives from the conspicuous disparity among patenting entities. That is, there is a small number of highly innovative giant organizations that produce the lion’s share of patents while the remaining only produce a tiny fraction and are scattered and fragmented. The finding infers that as long as the disparity exists, the stagnation of co-patenting networks in Daejeon will continue. Further studies will follow to explore ensuing issues on: the similarities and differences between Daejeon and other regions; the underlying factors and mechanisms for the stagnation; and how the government can intervene in order to escape the stagnation.