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헌법과 재정(Constitution and fiscal institutions)

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  • 헌법과 재정(Constitution and fiscal institutions)
  • 김정훈; 박형수; 김종면; 최준욱; 김현아; 홍승현
  • 한국조세연구원


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Title 헌법과 재정(Constitution and fiscal institutions)
Similar Titles
Material Type Reports
Author(Korean)

김정훈; 박형수; 김종면; 최준욱; 김현아; 홍승현

Publisher

서울:한국조세연구원

Date 2010-12
Pages 311
Subject Country South Korea(Asia and Pacific)
Language Korean
File Type Link
Subject Economy < Economic Administration
Government and Law < Laws and Legislation
Holding 한국조세연구원

Abstract

The impact of constitutional changes, which are currently discussed in Korea, on the welfare of people is significant. This report therefore investigates the implications of constitutional articles related to public finance and devolution. According to the analysis In chapter 2, it is desirable to reinforce legislative branch's power on budgeting and accounting. However it is also desirable to delegate to executive branch the power to control the total size of budget to avoid common pool problem. According to the analysis in chapter 3, the constitution of Korea is such that it makes Korea one of the most centralized countries along with Nordic countries and Japan. Given the sizes of economy and population of Korea, however, it is desirable to make the constitution in Korea to fit more with decentralized system. The recent constitutional changes in France, Italy and Switzerland offer good case studies in this regard. In chapter 4, it was shown that, in a country like Korea whether a majority political party is commonly established, delegation approach with regard to public financial management is more desirable than contract approach, which is more suitable for a country where a coalition government is more commonly established. Therefore the analysis of chapter 4 supports the conclusion of chapter 2 which recommends the balanced power between legislative and executive branches in dealing with budgetary issues.