This paper studies the relation between competition and efficiency in government procurement by focusing on the three issues, “Multiple Award Schedule”, “Best Price Bidding” and “Leniency Program”.
Under Multiple Award Schedule, several contractors supply the same item with different characteristics and the price is determined not by the competitive bidding but by the negotiation with procurement agent. Among these multiple providers, each consumer of government procurement will choose his favorite one. This form of contract will satisfy the demand for variety but may enforce inefficiency due to low competition and monopolistic standing of different products. This article explains advantage and disadvantage of Multiple Award Schedule with simple models and suggests policy implication on its appropriate usage.
“Best Price Bidding” applied to big building projects is based on competitive bidding to obtain cost efficiency. By using the theoretical results of bidding auctions which have similar structural forms to bidding procurements, we could formalize multiple regression models to analyze the impact of reservation values on the award ratio. The determinant variables of construction classes, reservation prices, and competent bidders number are proved to be statistically meaningful. Since the elasticity of the award ratio with respect to reservation values is so small that the critical value for applying the best price bidding would be lowered on the condition of enhancing the validity of choosing competent bidders. Another possible suggestion would be the introduction of the best value bidding to the construction classes which have complex construction technologies. (The rest omitted)
- 경쟁과 정부조달의 효율성 연구(Competition and efficiency in government procurement)
- 박상원; 김진
경쟁과 정부조달의 효율성 연구(Competition and efficiency in government procurement)
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서울 : 한국조세연구원
|Subject Country||South Korea(Asia and Pacific)|
|Subject||Economy < Economic Administration|