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경쟁법 집행효과에 대한 경제분석(Economic analysis of the effect of execution of competition law)

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  • 경쟁법 집행효과에 대한 경제분석(Economic analysis of the effect of execution of competition law)
  • 김대욱; 김종호
  • 공정거래위원회


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Title 경쟁법 집행효과에 대한 경제분석(Economic analysis of the effect of execution of competition law)
Similar Titles
Material Type Report
Author(Korean)

김대욱; 김종호

Publisher

[세종] : 공정거래위원회

Date 2012-07
Pages 190
Subject Country United States(Americas)
South Korea(Asia and Pacific)
United Kingdom(Europe)
Netherlands(Europe)
Language Korean
File Type Link
Original Format pdf
Subject Economy < Financial Policy
Economy < Economic Administration
Economy < Economic System
Holding 행정안전부
License

Abstract

□ The present study measures the impact of legal enforcement of the Fair Trade Commission on consumer welfare by anti-competitive practice type: abusive market dominance; industrial combination, and unfair collusion.

○ From 2000-2011, nine representative cases were selected by legal enforcement type; the effect of law enforcement was measured and the economic welfare change of consumers is listed as above.

□ This study measured the economic effects of law enforcement by the Fair Trade Commission by classifying cases as abusive market dominance, industrial combination, and unfair collusive practices
○ To estimate the economic effects of law enforcement, we calculated the scope of related sales and duration of anti-competitive acts in the absence of law enforcement, while considering the Korea’s unique circumstances.
- This study used a formula to estimate “expected duration,” derived from a regression analysis by considering that if the duration of collusion from the time of discovery of anti-competitive behavior is fewer than 15 quarters, the actual and expected duration of collusion has a positive correlation; and if the duration is more than 15 quarters, there exists a negative correlation.
○This study raised standard price increase rate from 10% to 15% according to the new standard of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT).
○ Furthermore, this study estimates the effect of law enforcement by the Fair Trade Commission by using duration.
Pursuant to analysis results, the leniency policy was strengthened in 2005, the probability of collusion has declined, suggesting that the average duration of cartels exposed increased because of the stricter leniency policy.

Furthermore, regarding to cases where penalty amounts were relatively large, collusive cases subject to the leniency system were less likely to be exposed than were cases not subject to the leniency system, indicating that the average duration of cartels exposed by the leniency increased.
This study found that the enforcement of competition laws by the Fair Trade Commission can control collusion, at least in the short term.