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Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity

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  • Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity
  • Diamond, Douglas W.; Dybvig, Philip H.
  • The University of Chicago Press


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Title Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity
Similar Titles
Material Type Article
Author(English)

Diamond, Douglas W.; Dybvig, Philip H.

Publisher

[Chicago] : The University of Chicago Press

Date 1983-06
Journal Title; Vol./Issue Journal of Political Economy:vol.91(no.3)
Pages 19
Subject Country United States(Americas)
Language English
File Type Link
Subject Economy < Financial Policy
Economy < Economic Conditions
Economy < Economic Administration
Holding JSTOR
License

Abstract

This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.