When the US hedge fund management firm, Elliott Management, opposed its takeover of Cheil Industries in 2015, Samsung C&T proceeded to sell its entire treasury holdings to KCC Corporation. Thereafter, using its newly acquired voting rights, KCC Corporation approved the merger. The fact that such a transaction was possible is owed to Korea’s current laws, permitting the sale of treasury stocks with only a board resolution. Essentially, the sale of treasury stocks and issuance of new shares are one in the same. As both increase stock trade volume and secure outside funding. However, a discrepancy exists between the two according to contemporary law, and this, in turn, creates a loophole that can be made by companies to protect their management rights. Still, not all identical economic natures require identical legal regulations. If the positive economic impact generated from the sale of treasury stocks is significant enough, considerations can be made within the legal system. Accordingly, this study examines the economic impact of the protection of management rights through the sale of treasury stock. Take for example, a controlling shareholder who is managing two different companies in two different sectors; companies A and B. Then, an outside managing executive appears with the intent to obtain the management rights of company B. In response, in order to protect his or her managing rights, the controlling shareholder mobilizes company A’s funds to purchase company B’s treasury stocks.