Investments can be compiled by the types of project: i.e., :Build-Transfer-Own (BTO) vs. Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL)##LINK_POPUP####MAINTITLE:Build-Transfer-Own (BTO) vs. Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL)##TITLE: Definition##CONTENT:"Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) PPP Project" means a project where the investment cost is recovered through user fees paid by users of the facilities of the project.
"Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL) Project" means a project where the investment cost is recovered through the rent paid by the central government or a local government for the facilities of the project as user fees.
##TITLE: Build-Transfer-Own (BTO) vs. Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL)
##CONTENT:As of December 2014, there were a total of 225 BTO projects of various statuses: 172 were in operation; 32 projects were under construction; and 21 were in preparation for construction. The total amount of investment stood at over 69.9 trillion won. Road projects prevailed over others, being followed by railways, port facilities and logistics projects.
In addition, a total of 452 BTL projects were signed and were of various stages during the same period of time, with a total investment amount of 32.7 trillion won. Now 408 of these projects are in operation; 31 under construction; the remaining 13 are in preparation for construction.
##SOURCE:A report on PPP projects in 2013: Current status and achievement ##LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/resource/view/05201508250139610.do##SOURCE:A report on PPP projects in 2014: Current status and achievement ##LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/all/private-sector-investment-projects-2014--04201511190142278.do##LINK_POPUP_END##; Solicited vs. Unsolicited##LINK_POPUP####MAINTITLE: Solicited vs. Unsolicited
##CONTENT:"Solicited Project" means a project that the competent authority discovers and designates as a potential PPP project pursuant to Article 8-2 of the Act and in which private-sector entities are solicited to participate.
"Unsolicited Project" means a project that a private entity discovers as a potential PPP project pursuant to Article 9 of the Act and proposes it as a PPP project to the competent authority.
##TITLE: Solicited vs. Unsolicited Projects
##CONTENT:According to 2012 statistics, a total of 528 projects were of the solicited variety, worth 56.6 trillion won of total investment while unsolicited projects numbered at 105. The latter type constituted only a fifth of the total PPP projects, but slightly more than one third of the total investment amount. Unsolicited projects were more likely to be large and diverse in character as compared to solicited projects.
During this same period, 483 solicited projects were in operation, producing significant amount of public services of different sorts, and 116 of the projects remained under construction. Another 32 of the projects were in preparation for construction and only two of these were transferred to the government as the contractual period was expired.
##LINK_POPUP_END##; and National vs. Local##LINK_POPUP_MINI####MAINTITLE: National vs. Local PPPs
##TITLE:##CONTENT:A total of 63 out of 225 BTO projects were national projects, with a total investment of 56.6 trillion won, and the remaining 162 of the projects were either local or regional, accounting for 45% of the total investment (36.8 trillion won). The total number of projects in operation now stand at 48 for national and 124 for local, respectively. Many were either under construction or in a preparatory stage. Among 63 national BTO projects, 48 of them are in operation while only 10 are under construction. On the other hand, 124 local BTO projects are in operation and 22 others are under construction.
There are a total of 452 BTL projects; 357 of them are local and only 95 are national. Almost a half of the BTL projects are school projects, being followed by sewage/environmental facility projects, military housing projects, and railway construction projects. Seventy five of the national BTL projects are in operation, while only 12 are under construction. Most of the local BTL projects are in operation (333) while only 19 are under construction.
##3D_LAYER##Yongin-Seoul Expressway##3D_TEXT:Yongin-Seoul Expressway##3D_LINK:http://www.yseway.com/##3D_LAYER_END## and 76 road construction projects generated 38.6 trillion won (41.2.6% of total investment). The distant second was the ##3D_LAYER##Incheon Airport Railroad Express##3D_TEXT:Incheon International Airport Highway 1 (photo)##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/incheon-international-airport-highway-1--01201510210140504.do?fldIds=TP_TER|TP_TER_TR#.Vndms7aLTcs##3D_LAYER_END## and 7 other ##3D_LAYER##railway##3D_TEXT:1) Hong, S-M. (2015). When does a public-private partnership(PPP) lead to inefficient cost management : Evidence from the Korean urban rail transit system.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/when-does-public-private-partnership-ppp-lead-inefficient-cost-management--05201506100138460.do##3D_TEXT:2) Mun and Kim (2013). Korea’s railway development strategies.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/koreas-railway-development-strategies--05201407020132638.do##3D_TEXT:3) Lee, J. (2014). The history of Korean railway by photographs. ##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/history-korerailway-photographs--05201503120137170.do##3D_LAYER_END## projects, generating 17.3 trillion won (18.6% of the total), which was followed by ##3D_LAYER##Pusan New Port##3D_TEXT:1) OECD (2010). Environmental impacts of imternational shipping: A case study of the port of Busan##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/environmental-impacts-imternational-shipping--05201506100138448.do?fldIds=TP_TER|TP_TER_TR|TP_TER_EN#.Vm5tqdKLTct##3D_TEXT:2) Conventional Wharf##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/government-law/conventional-wharf--05201512010142449.do?fldIds=TP_GOV|TP_GOV_GE#.VndY6baLTcs##3D_TEXT:3) Busan New Port##3D_LINK:http://www.pncport.com/eng/##3D_LAYER_END## and 16 other ##3D_LAYER##port facility##3D_TEXT:Daecheon Port, Mokpo New Port and Gamcheon port##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/daecheon-port-mokpo-new-port-gamcheon-port--05201512010142453.do?fldIds=TP_TER|TP_TER_MA#.VndZQbaLTcs##3D_LAYER_END## projects (6.3 trillion won or 6.7%), ##3D_LAYER##Sanitary Landfill Gas Resource Project in Seoul##3D_TEXT:1) South Pole Carbon Asset Management Ltd. (2011). Clean energy from landfill gas, South Korea.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/industry-technology/cleenergy-landfill-gas-south-korea--05201510200140473.do?fldIds=TP_IND|TP_IND_EN#.VidLsZXouUk##3D_TEXT:2) APEC. (2014). Infrastructure public-private partnership case studies of APEC member economies.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/economy/infrastructure-public-private-partnership-case-studies-apec-member-economies--04201506110138469.do?fldIds=TP_ECO|TP_ECO_GE|TP_TER|TP_TER_NA#.VYo6UWow-Uk##3D_TEXT:3) Landfill gas and RPF-To-Energy ##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/landfill-gas-rpf-to-energy--05201512010142446.do?fldIds=TP_TER|TP_TER_EN#.VndYTraLTcs##3D_LAYER_END## and 66 other environmental projects (11.7 trillion won or 12.5%), logistics projects (1.3 trillion won or 1.4%) and other miscellaneous projects (1.7 trillion won or 2.8%).
The 424 BTL projects generated a total of 26.9 trillion won of investment as of 2012, which was almost 40% of the total BTO investment projects. Normally BTL project are more likely small in size and scale, and thus, far less costly to execute than BTO projects.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Comprehensive evaluation of Korean PPP (2012, PIMAC of KDI) ##3D_LAYER_END## ##MORE_LAYER##
It should be noted that the government subsidy also grew with an increase in private investments, resulting from an increase in concession agreements as indicated by the figure. For example, 16 concession agreements incurred 3.1 trillion won of government subsidy while generating over 7.4 trillion won in 2005. On the other hand, a total of 7.5 trillion won for 17 projects was generated in 2008, but the government subsidy was only 1.5 trillion won due to limited application of the MRG subsidy system.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Korean on Institutional Arrangements and Performance (2013). pp. 60. Figure 2-4.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/resource/view/04201306130126672.do##3D_LAYER_END## ##MORE_LAYER_END##
Reduction of Fiscal Burden
The amount of PPP investment increased from 0.3 trillion won in 1996 to 3.2 trillion won in 2007. Consequently, the rate of PPP investment to total infrastructure investment grew from a 1.2% to 17.4% during that period, increasing the promotion of PPP helped ease the government’s budgetary pressure. Incidentally the percentage of fiscal investment in infrastructure by government agencies fell from 46.6% in 2000 to 30.8% in 2008 while that of the private investment through PPPs rose from only 1.7% to 15.1% over the same period.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Korean on Institutional Arrangements and Performance (2013). p.101.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/resource/view/04201306130126672.do##3D_LAYER_END##
Contribution to Economic Growth
PPPs helped in stimulating economic growth by allocating additional government budget funds into other areas due to budget savings for infrastructure investment. The rate of growth in fiscal investment by government agencies was only 2% on average since 2000, but the growth rate of private investment through PPPs soared up to 25.9%. It is estimated that private investment through PPPs contributed to the expansion of the national economy by an additional 0.198% in 2008. ##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Korean on Institutional Arrangements and Performance (2013). p.101-105.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/resource/view/04201306130126672.do##3D_LAYER_END## But this appears to be only a short term economic effect; a longitudinal study may result in much larger economic growth effect. ##MORE_LAYER##
A KDI study revealed that an increase in 1 trillion won in private capital expenditure, for such projects of infrastructure investment, would expand GDP by about 0.02% in the years of execution and 0.01% in the following year. The multiplier of the government expenditure is estimated to be about 0.25%. Taken in sum, the impact of the PPPs on the national economy is likely to be substantial in the long run if these figures are applied to PPP investments and long term GDP growth estimation. ##MORE_LAYER_END##
Promotion of PPP Businesses
Evidently PPPs promote a variety of private businesses, including; consulting, engineering, financing, construction, facility (asset) management and operation, and real estate development. Especially, the long-term financing market has developed due to project financing practices and experience. In addition, the overall performance of such businesses has been rated fairly well. The rate of return##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:PPP Basic Plan (CC: Construction Cost, OR: Operating Cost, OC: Operating Cost, r: discount rate)##3D_LAYER_END## on investment among the PPPs looks reasonable too, with road and port projects ranked relatively high, 11.2% and 12.91, respectively, given that the 10-year average ROI across all the projects is 10.23. The rate of return has gradually risen since 1998 and peaked at 16.21% in 2002, but it quickly declined afterward until 2012.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Korean on Institutional Arrangements and Performance (2013). p. 89-93##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/resource/view/04201306130126672.do##3D_LAYER_END##
Since 2005, when the value-for-money (vfm) test was introduced into South Korea, over 214 proposals were assessed for vfm. Among the 214 projects, 65 were rejected even without testing due to various reasons such as legal ineligibility, improper project concept, or non-specific proposal preparation etc. Among the 149 tested projects##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Initially the test was applied to 214 projects, but 65 of them were disqualified for such test because of such reasons as legal ineligibility, improper project concept, and non-specific project preparation. Accordingly only 149 projects were subject to the test.##3D_LAYER_END## 84 have passed and the remaining 65 didn't satisfy vfm criteria. So, the passage ratio is about 57% (about 40% if we included all of the submitted projects). ##MORE_LAYER##
The contribution of vfm testing to fiscal soundness can be measured in a straight-forward way by simply adding expected vfm of passed projects, for example, adding expected vfm of 65 projects that had passed the tests from 2005 to 2009 in Korea. The sum of vfm is estimated at about $1.4 bil, which means each project would have saved about $21.5 mil of government budget. In addition, PIMAC of KDI recommended project revision for further enhancement of vfm in each report, which impact would have summed up to $0.7 bil. These amounts represent the saved cost from the perspective of whole society due to efficiency of PPP. ##MORE_LAYER_END##
According to a research study##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Comprehensive evaluation of Korean PPP (2012, PIMAC of KDI)##3D_LAYER_END## [more effective if you reference the study], 71 among 155 road projects that Korean government constructed through traditional procurement from 1999 to 2012 had experienced time overrun. The ratio of delayed projects is about 46%, and average delay period is about 0.93 years. On the other hand, no PPP project experienced time overrun during the same period. To the contrary, most PPP projects achieved earlier completion and thus, early service provision. ##MORE_LAYER##
For example, the study [more effective if you reference the study, unless same study above] sampled 43 BTL projects of South Korea to analyze time and cost overrun. The study concluded that the average time overrun was negative (-)8.04%, and the average cost overrun was negative (-)10.18%. Therefore, overall, PPP projects have increased additional time value of services due to earlier completion and savings of construction costs. ##MORE_LAYER_END##
Gradual Recognition of PPPs among the Users
According to a survey conducted by KDI’s PIMAC, 83.5% of the users were satisfied with the BTL type of projects.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Comprehensive evaluation of Korean PPP (2012, PIMAC of KDI)##3D_LAYER_END## That is very high indeed, but it declined to 51.6% on average when a high level of user fees, relative to the publicly provided facility, is taken into account. It turned out that the most satisfied were the cultural and tourism facilities while the least satisfied were the educational facilities. ##MORE_LAYER##
The KDI PIMAC study tested the hypothesis that “BTL-oriented facilities are superior to government-financed ones” in terms of quality and convenience, and found it acceptable at 95 percent level of significance. The way that the respondents understood “superiority” was that “the physical structures are diverse in the exterior and functional in the interior.” In fact 77.5% of the respondents preferred privately-provided infrastructure services to government-funded ones and wanted to see the PPP-driven facilities be expanded.
Presumably slightly less satisfactory responses may be found if such survey studies were addressed to the consumers who frequently use BTO projects such as expressway, subway, port facilities and etc. Consumers may not be so pleased initially to pay for additional costs, but they will gradually appreciate BTO-oriented facilities when they find them comparatively clean, convenient and safe. ##MORE_LAYER_END##
Proper Operation and Management of the PPP Projects
1. ##3D_LAYER##Subway line #9##3D_TEXT:Seoul Metro Line 9 Co.Ltd. (2010). New approach of private subway system: Seoul Metro Line No.9.##3D_LINK:https://www.kdevelopedia.org/Resources/territorial-development/new-approach-private-subway-system--05201510210140547.do?fldIds=TP_TER|TP_TER_TR#.Vm51cdKLTct##3D_LAYER_END##
Compared to the other metro-lines owned by Seoul City, which had a 'production and staff oriented organization' model, the Metro 9 applied the 'customer oriented organization' model##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:Other lines are known to rely on “production and staff oriented organization model” instead.##3D_LAYER_END##. Metro 9 maintained less than 22 staffs /km, while the average of other City lines are over 55 staffs /km. The maintenance [for the line] was performed on a 'predictive basis', while others are performed on a 'planned and corrective basis'.##3D_LAYER####3D_TEXT:The line was managed on "predictive basis", while others, on "planned and corrective basis". The staff of the Line #9 was promoted on "performance basis", while other lines depended on "seniority basis". One innovative idea realized for Line #9 was to allow convenience stores to sell tickets at each station, thus reducing the queue at the ticket box.##3D_LAYER_END## The promotion of staffs is 'performance basis' , while others are on a 'seniority basis'. One of the more interesting ideas is reducing the queue at the ticket box by allowing convenience stores to sell tickets in each station.
[Figure 3-1. Yongin-Seoul Expressway / Source:Gyeongsu Highway]
The project has a MRG clause in the contract, which means if the revenue of the SPC falls under pre-determined criteria (70% of forecasted revenue in this project), the government should make-up for the shortfall. However, due to the reasonable initial demand forecasting, there occurred no MRG payments except during one early operation period ($3.9 mil) before ramp-up was realized. The ridership is over MRG criteria; and thus, currently there is no more government financial burden. ##MORE_LAYER_BOX##
Featuring a total of seven interchanges, reducing travel time between Heungdeok and Segok-dong from 45 minutes to 23 minutes
□ The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) has recently announced that the new Yongin-Seoul Expressway (extending a total of 22.9 kilometers) will be open for service as of midnight on July 1, providing a new route linking the Heungdeok District of Yongin to Segok-dong in Gangnam, Seoul, via Gwanggyo and Pangyo.
□ The construction cost of the new expressway reached a total of KRW 1.4932 trillion (including KRW 573.2 billion from private-sector investors, KRW 367.3 billion from the national treasury, and KRW 552.7 billion in compensation). Since ground was first broken on the expressway in October 2005, it took a total of 44 months of construction work to complete the project, the shortest construction period on record for private expressways in Korea. The completion of the new expressway was scheduled to coincide with the rush of tenants moving into the newly constructed cities nearby.
□ The new expressway will significantly reduce the traffic congestion that has plagued drivers traveling between Seoul and the new cities nearby, such as Heungdeok, Gwanggyo, Pangyo, and Dongtan, thereby dramatically improving traffic conditions in the southern part of the Seoul-Gyeonggi region.
ㅇ The Heongdeok-Osan Road, the construction of which has been led by the Korea Land and Housing Corporation and which is connected to the new expressway, will enter into service simultaneously, drastically cutting the travel time between Osan-Dongtan and Segok-dong.
□ The tolls will be KRW 1,000 at the West Suji Station and KRW 800 at the Geumto Station. Traveling the entire length of the new expressway (22.9 kilometers) will thus cost KRW 1,800, which is equivalent to the expressway tolls charged at toll stations operated by Korea Express Corporation.
□ Furthermore, in an effort to preserve the surrounding ecosystem, 60 percent of the new expressway was built in the form of tunnels and bridges, and the construction process involved creating and installing various amenities for locals, including soundproof tunnels, lighting on bridges, artificial waterfalls, and athletic facilities installed below the expressway.
[Figure 3-2. Heonneung IC & Hasanungyo Bridge / Source : fmtv]
Yongin-Seoul Expressway Project
• Stretching from Yeongdeok-dong, Yongin, to Segok-dong, Gangnam, Seoul
• Total length: 22.9 kilometers (featuring four to six lanes)
*From Heungdeok to Godeung: six lanes (18.0 kilometers), from Godeung to Heonneung: four lanes (4.9 kilometers)
• Project type: build-to-order (BTO), with the ownership of the road returned to the state upon the completion of construction, for 30 years of operation
• Cost: KRW 1.4932 trillion (KRW 573.2 billion from private-sector investors, KRW 367.3 billion from the national treasury, and KRW 552.7 billion in compensation)
• Construction period: October 31, 2005, to June 30, 2009
• Developer: Gyeongsu Expressway Incorporated
*Investors: Macquarie Korea Infrastructure Fund, Korea Infrastructure Fund II, Daewoo E&C, Lotte E&C, Shindongah E&C, SK E&C, Sungjee E&C, and Wonha E&C.
□ Expected benefits
• To expand and improve the status of the metropolitan road network in the southern part of the Seoul-Gyeonggi region;
• To alleviate traffic congestion on the Gyeongbu National Expressway;
• To the reduce travel time between Heungdeok and Segok-dong by 22 minutes and generate KRW 88.6 billion in total benefits annually.
• September 2002: BTO proposal received.
• September to December 2003: Bidding announcement made.
• January 2005: Contract signed.
• October 2005: Construction commenced.
• June 2009: Construction completed.
3. Sanitary Landfill Gas Resource Project in Seoul
Methane gas extraction wells were installed at the Nanji landfill site in Seoul, from which methane gas has been captured. The captured gas is sent to the Korea District Heating Corporation (KDHC), and KDHC combusts the gas, and distributes the heat energy to nearby facilities and households for heating and cooking. The project is very significant in the sense that it promotes environmental sustainability while providing a domestic fuel source. Clearly it also addresses itself to the climate change as methane consists of a powerful greenhouse gas (GHG). ##MORE_LAYER_BOX##
The Landfill Gas Resource Project, Korea
I. Project description
a. Background and Resources
The Sudokwon Landfill Site is an area measuring 15,410,000 m2 that is used for the disposal of waste from Seoul, Incheon, and 58 cities, counties, and districts within Gyeonggi-do. Originally, it was slated to receive a total of 2,780,000 tons of waste between 1992 and 2022. The first landfill site included total landfill facilities of 2,510,000 m2 out of a 4,040,000 m2 lot area; by October 2000, disposal had been completed for 64 million tons of waste there since 1992, and a second site was put into use for disposal. Disposal of 78 million tons at the second site is expected to be complete by February 2015, at which point third and four sites would be constructed nearby. Once they have been built, the area is expected to be able to accommodate waste for disposal through 2044.
[Figure 3-3. Current status of landfills / Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government]
[Table 3.1 : The sudokwon Landfill Site Today]
|Project Title||Sudokwon Landfill Gas Resource Project|
|Location||Sudokwon Landfill, 58 Baekseok-dong, Seo-gu, Incheon|
• Power Facilities: One 50MW steam turbine
• Lot Size: 38,000m2
• Electricity Transmission: One three-phase circuit (143 KV)
The Sudokwon Landfill Site has been used since 1992 for the disposal of waste from the Seoul Metropolitan Area. The input and burial of over 20,000 tons of waste matter on average each day has resulted in the production of harmful substances, including methane. The government has allocated significant amount of budget to prevent the serious threat to the surrounding environment from the stench and atmospheric warming. The Landfill Gas Recycling Project was introduced as one such response measure, designed to develop alternative energy sources and reduce environmental pollution by making use of landfill gases (LFGs), such as methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO2) from the waste disposal process.
b. Project Details
The project involves developing power generation facilities (per Asterisk 2 in Article 4 of the Enforcement Decree for the Wastes Control Act) designed to capture LFGs from the first and second landfill sites, which qualify as waste energy according to the Act on the Promotion of the Development and Use of Alternative Energy, and convert them into electric energy. The basic idea is to build a resource cycling system in which horizontal and vertical gas collection ducts (facilities) installed within the landfill are used to capture all of the LFGs produced during the disposal process, after which they are sent to the power generation facility (steam turbine) and converted into energy. The goals of the project are two-fold: One, to develop new energy resources and improve the quality of the surrounding environment. Two, to generate an energy substitution effect and economic value-added through electricity production. The table below provides a detailed description of the project’s status. The effort is especially noteworthy in that it was pursued as a PPP solicited project, with a concession agreement signed under a build-transfer-operate (BTO) scheme for the profits generated from the sale of LFG-derived electricity. It was 100% privately funded, without any government financial support in the form of construction subsidies, and minimum revenue guarantees (MRGs) were granted for electricity sales, creating a structure where government and private operators shared the attendant risks.
The project aims to reduce environmental pollution by converting LFGs into resources and generating economic value-added through electricity production
[Table 3.2 : Technical Details on the Landfill Gas Resource Project]
|Major Facilities||• Header Pipe: Landfill gas collection and transfer|
• Condensation Water Removal Well: Facility for removing condensation water in landfill gas
• Incinerator: Landfill gas incinerator
• Simple Incinerator: Landfill stench removal
|Treatment Statistics||• Holding Capacity: 868,256 m2/ day|
• Incinerator Treatment Capacity: 346,320 m2/ day
• Power Generation Capacity: 531,936 m2/ day
|Power Generation Facilities||• LFG power generation output of 50 MW|
Source : Sudokwon Landfill Site Management Corporation