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Regulatory reforms 3

Policymaking in the Interest of Regulatory Reforms (1980 to 1992)
 
The state-led market economy born and consolidated under the Rhee and Park administrations has had both positive and negative results: namely, fast economic development and increased regulations on the positive side, and weakened market health and creativity of the private sector on the negative. Such political and economic system characteristics could not last long, however, as the demand for transformation of the state-market relationship began to grow in the face of internal political conflicts and the global economic crisis.

The Chun Doohwan administration inherited much of its economic policy from the Park administration, but also attempted at partial economic liberalization so as to abolish regulation rents and boost market functions. The Chun era, however, is also marked by some of the most notorious attempts at curtailing the move toward social democratization. The succeeding Roh Taewoo administration, however, took the regulatory reforms attempted by the Chun administration to the next level, extending extend them into the social sphere as well. It was under these two administrations that a “formative period of regulatory reform policies” unfolded, in the sense described by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
 
(1) Chun Doohwan Administration (September 1980 to February 1988)
 
1) Overview of Regulatory Reforms under the Chun Administration[1]
Facing a worsening economic situation at home and abroad, including negative economic growth, when it took office, the Chun administration focused first and foremost on raising the economic growth rate. Based on the judgment that the growth-first belief of the Park era was no longer working, the Chun administration sought to lift or reduce regulations that inhibited the autonomy and creativity of the private sector, with a view to achieving an open and self-leading economy.[2] To this end, various price regulations were abolished, while the autonomy of the financial sector and the liberalization of imports were promoted. These developments indicate a fundamental shift from state intervention to deregulation as a main instrument for economic growth. The move toward deregulation was institutionalized when the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) was introduced and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) was organized.[3] Moreover, the new administration also dropped the comprehensive support of specific targeted industries in favor of supporting the reinforcement of the industrial structure, localizing the production of machine tools, and the creation of automated facilities. The Selective Industry Development Act simplified the administrative regulations that had previously made entry into the market difficult. The Act was later merged with the Industry Development Act. In line with the objective of achieving greater openness and lowering trade barriers, the Chun administration also overhauled the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 1983, and passed the Foreign Trade Act in 1986, thus expanding the scope of import liberalization, reducing tariffs, improving the foreign direct investment system, and opening up the capital market.[4]

 

In other words, the Chun administration may have inherited the authoritarian practices of the Park administration on the political front, but it also made strides in boosting the market mechanism on the economic front. The abolition of policy funds, in particular, eliminated regulation rents. The repeal of the fixed exchange rate system also eliminated rents on the foreign currency market. The relative rise in the position of finance and capital based on the market mechanism also created some tension between the state and the conglomerates.

 

This general trend toward deregulation in the economic sphere, in the interest of fostering the creativity and vitality of the private sector, was coupled with increasingly harsh measures to curtail the demand for social regulation and reforms. The regulatory reforms under the Chun administration, promoting the objectives of market liberalization and deregulation, thus had effects confined to the economic sphere only. The effects of revision of the government-led economic development strategy and the series of measures aimed at economic liberalization were also quite limited. This was so particularly because the private sector lacked experiences with market discipline, and accordingly remained inert and persisted in the practice of cultivating collusive relations with the government instead of assuming risk on their own through autonomous decision making.
 
 
2) System of Implementing Regulatory Reforms under the Chun Administration: Organizing the Committee for the Advancement of Systems for Growth and Development and Improving Administrative Regulations and Procedures Concerning Business Start-ups
 

  • Organizing the Committee for the Advancement of Systems for Growth and Development (CASGD)[5]

Over two decades beginning in the early 1960s through to the early 1980s, Korea achieved miraculous economic development, securing its position among the league of middle-income countries worldwide. Such explosive economic and social development, however, also amplified the repercussions of industrialization and urbanization. The Korean government managed these rapidly changing internal and external circumstances by and large in an improvised manner, which led to overlapping provisions and institutions. The unquestioning introduction of policies and systems from overseas also heightened the lack of congruence between policy and reality. Uniform, bureaucratic regulations, moreover, served to limit the autonomy and creativity of civil society, thus necessitating major institutional overhauls in the 1980s.

 

In response to this epochal demand for institutional reforms, the Korean government launched the Commission for Inquiring into the Factors Impeding Growth and Development on May 15, 1982, chaired by the Prime Minister and comprised of ministers as well as civilian experts from Korea’s economic, journalistic, academic, legal, and cultural circles as well as members of labor groups. The Commission was renamed in 1983 as the Committee for the Advancement of Systems for Growth and Development (CASGD). It identified 760 growth-impeding factors in total, across the 46 major policy projects, ministries, and departments of the government. These factors were labeled “improvement issues” to be eliminated or solved. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry represented the greatest number of improvement issues (145), followed by the Ministry of Energy and Resources (144), the Ministry of Culture and Education (64), the Ministry of Transportation (59), and the Ministry of Finance (55). The CASGD proposed the improvement of various governmental systems and procedures including in the areas of authorization and permission in general, administration of construction permits, management of imports and exports, support for small and medium businesses, administration of taxes, reporting in general, and the preservation of the natural environment, as well as civil and commercial laws.

 

Thanks to these efforts, administrative procedures became more systematic, and administrative authorities more delegated. The civil claim procedure was also improved to enhance public convenience and minimize the need for civilians to access and contact government organizations and offices. An administrative system for enhancing service orientation came into being, while the nightly curfew that had been in pace for 37 years since Korea’s liberation from Japan was finally repealed. A series of public services were simplified and various areas of civilian life were deregulated, all for the purpose of providing increased convenience and benefits for the public.
 

Improving Administrative Regulations and Procedures Concerning Business Start-ups

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a nongovernmental organization, conducted a comprehensive survey on the state of administrative regulations and procedures concerning business start-ups in May 1985. The survey found an eager audience in the Chun administration, which took seriously the survey authors’ observation that the complex and diverse administrative regulations and procedures for setting up businesses had given rise to many civil claims, while also delaying economic growth. The Chun administration thus responded by simplifying the authorization and licensing processes required of business start-ups. The representative change in this regard was the Small and Medium Business Start-up Support Act, passed in May 1986 to provide significant tax deductions and financial support for SMBs and to simplify the process of starting up businesses. Previously, an entrepreneur seeking to open his or her own business had to pass 26 authorization and licensing processes, pursuant to 17 laws, after submitting his business plan to the local civil service center for business start-ups, before finally being allowed to build a factory. All these processes were abolished as a result of the new Act.
 
3) Assessment of Regulatory Reforms under the Chun Administration
The deregulatory drive of the Chun administration sought to revitalize the process of economic development by expanding the scope of autonomy of the private sector held captive by state leadership since the 1960s. Its central focus was on reducing the economic and financial burdens on the private sector stemming from regulation and simplifying administrative procedures. As a result, the Korean economy began to grow again in the mid-1980s. Yet the Chun administration’s style of deregulation was biased in favor of convenience and expediency, thus neglecting important services that the government ought to have provided and also impeding the realization of other important political and social values. These problems arose because the process of deciding and enforcing regulatory reforms was devoid of participation by interest groups. These reforms were implemented overwhelmingly for the benefit of conglomerates and powerful bureaucrats rather than for the good of the public.[6]

 

In addition, the Chun administration strictly reinforced the regulations, restricting the activities of labor unions and labor-management disputes to an extent that exceeded those witnessed under the Park administration’s Yushin System. The rights and interests of workers were slighted by the Chun administration, casually and without much reflection. The deregulation of the market, moreover, accompanied restrictions on salaried workers’ wages and the prices of agricultural produce, with the policy of price stabilization thus primarily benefitting exporting conglomerates. As exporting companies began to import goods in greater quantities thanks to the lowering of trade barriers, fledgling SMBs and agricultural producers suffered greatly. In sum, the drive for economic stabilization and liberalization under the Chun administration dramatically increased income inequality and distorted the income distribution structure.[7] This was due to the lack of participation of diverse interest groups in the process of deciding and implementing reforms.[8] Because the deregulatory drive during this period was intended primarily to satisfy the interests of politically powerful conglomerates and bureaucrats and less to satisfy public interests, deregulation was first and foremost regarded not as a socioeconomic issue, but as a matter of intra- and interdepartmental relations.

 

Furthermore, the Chun administration used the façade of deregulation and liberalization to hide the alarming increase in political authoritarianism and repression. Many measures for strengthening the autonomy of the private sector were merely perfunctory, while businesses that grew under such a strong-handed government remained incapable of managing various socioeconomic burdens that arose as part of economic liberalization. In conclusion, regulatory reforms under the Chun administration did not amount to efforts for genuine deregulation.

 
[1] Ahn, 2002: 7-8 (with some information added).
[2] A similar view is echoed in Choi Byeongseon, Theory of Government Regulation, 2003: 804.
[3] Because the main purpose of the FTC is to eliminate competition-limiting factors so as to promote fairness and free competition in the market, the organization of such a body played a key role in the move toward deregulation.
[4] Lee, 2000: 41-44.
[5] Kim, 1992: 72-73.
[6] Choi, 2003: 804-810.
[7] Choi Daeyong, A Study on the Organization and Operating Principles of Regulatory Reforms: Focusing on the Cases of the Committee for Administrative Reformation and the Regulatory Reform Committee, doctoral dissertation submitted to Korea University, 2004: 76-77.
[8] Choi, 2003: 813-822.


Source: Korea Institute of Public Administration. 2008. Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.

 

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(2) Roh Taewoo Administration (February 1988 to February 1993)
 
1) Overview of Regulatory Reforms under the Roh Administration
The Roh Taewoo administration marks the middle point in the transition from the authoritarian government of the Park and Chun eras to the democratic government under the two succeeding administrations of Kim Youngsam and Kim Daejung. The transitional character of the Roh administration is reflected in its policies for regulatory reforms. The rising demand for political democratization in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarianism manifested itself in increasing demands for regulation in the social sphere, especially concerning the environment, industrial safety, and labor relations. The number and scope of social regulations (at least in terms of statutory provisions) multiplied rapidly under the Roh administration consequently.[1] However, the Roh administration’s market-oriented policies did not work out as effectively as hoped because the regulations inherited from predecessors continued to restrict the private sector. In the meantime, the decreasing control over employees working for the central government gave rise to the prevalence of corruptive behavior among civil servants.[2] The Roh era is significant for scholars of regulatory reforms because it marks the first time in Korean history when the understanding of regulatory reforms began to coincide with that of deregulation.[3] Recognizing that excessive regulation served only to inhibit the autonomy and creativity of the private sector and increase the inefficiency of the economy as a whole now that the scale and structure of the Korean economy were rapidly expanding, the Roh administration launched the Committee for Administrative Deregulation in May 1988 under direct presidential supervision. In addition, the People’s Advisory Committee for Administrative Deregulation also came into being and was placed under the Prime Minister’s supervision. It was also during the Roh era that the FTC, first established under the Chun administration, began to play a leading role in the move toward deregulation as a main advocate for market competition. From the perspective of regulatory reforms, the policy of economic liberalization that began under the Chun administration proceeded at an accelerated pace under the Roh administration in conjunction with the economic opening up policy. This transition period also began to see more signs of autonomy in the private sector.
 
2) System of Implementing Regulatory Reforms under the Roh Administration: the Public-Private Joint Council for the Consolidation of Economic Statutes, the Committee for Administrative Deregulation, and the People’s Advisory Committee for Administrative Deregulation
 

Public-Private Joint Council for the Consolidation of Economic Statutes (CCES)[4]

It was under the Chun administration that the campaign, led by the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and other nongovernmental organizations, for consolidating economic statutes began, with a view to achieving a more liberal market economy. Beginning in June 1987, these organizations began to survey the state of market economy in Korea and identify issues requiring improvements and solutions, including: (1) the need to revisit and alter the government-led economic development strategy in response to the growing maturity of the Korean economy, the increasing competence of the private sector, and the march of economic globalization; (2) the need to redefine the mutual roles of the government and corporations in the interest of boosting the market, and to reinforce deregulation and private initiatives for the realization of free enterprise principles; and (3) the need for administrative reforms as means to achieve the democratization of the market, promote fair trade, and achieve a small government in line with worldwide trends. In response, the Roh administration inaugurated the Public-Private Joint Council for the Consolidation of Economic Statutes (CCES) on March 15, 1988, with the Economic Planning Board playing a central role. The CCES was charged with the task of identifying excessive government interference and streamlining rules and institutions in various areas of government regulation, including distance restraint and other regulatory measures criticized by nongovernmental economic organizations in 408 policy proposals. The CCES also led investigations into the states of foreign transactions, industries in general, energy and resources, science and technology, sanitation, workers’ rights, land use, construction, finance, and the economic order.
 

Committee for Administrative Deregulation (CAD) and the People’s Advisory Committee for Administrative Deregulation (PACAD)[5]

The CAD was founded on May 31, 1990, with the Prime Minister as its chair and 21 ministers and officials of related ministries as its members. The CAD announced ambitious plans for regulatory reforms on a number of issues, including: the deregulation of labor-management disputes; the reinforcement of credit control, for the purpose of mitigating the concentration of wealth; the introduction of financial transactions under real names; the reinforcement of regulatory measures for fair trade and consumer protection; the legislative endorsement of public ownership; the reinforcement of environmental regulations; and the introduction of the minimum wage law. The plan, however, met with hostility from the corporate community.[6]

 

The CAD set up two additional committees for its operation: namely, the Working Committee for Administrative Deregulation of the Economy (chaired by the then Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Board), and the Working Committee for General Administrative Regulation (chaired by the then Vice Minister of the Government Administration). These two committees together commissioned on-site surveys of 52 governmental institutions and written surveys of 130 more institutions, thus identifying 893 issues of deregulation in total. Table 2-2 summarizes the work undertaken by the CAD, along with these two new committees, in the area of administrative deregulation.
 
<Table 2·2> Deregulation Record of the CAD under the Roh Administration

Regulations Total Abolished Integrated Loosened Simplified Reinforced Other
Existing 764 290 17 207 193 5 52
New 129 32 - 48 38 1 10
Total 893 322 17 255 231 6 62

Source: Ministry of Government Administration, 1992.
 

In the meantime, facing criticism over the composition of CAD being too heavily biased in favor of the government, Presidential Decree 13470 was announced on September 18, 1991, heralding the formation of the People’s Advisory Committee for Administrative Deregulation (PACAD), under the Prime Minister’s supervision and comprised of five civilian experts. The PACAD set up four subcommittees (two concerning individual and household activities and two concerning corporate activities) and identified 18 types of activities to be reviewed. The Committee heard opinions and complaints from diverse groups of Korean society until late March 1992, drawing up 649 proposals for regulatory reforms in total. The proposals were then shared with, and reviewed by, various ministries and departments, and the government accepted suggested reforms on 393 (60.6 percent) of the proposals. In particular, the burdens on Korean businesses were alleviated through the simplification or reduction of regulations on a variety of subjects, including market entry, pricing, safety, mandatory employment of license holders, imports, and so forth, improvements achieved via joint meetings of the related ministries and departments.
 
3) Assessment of Regulatory Reforms under the Roh Taewoo Administration[7]
Whereas the number of regulatory reforms implemented prior to 1987 was 39 per year on average, the figure dramatically increased to 322 a year on average after the inauguration of the Roh administration in 1988 (Table 2-3).
 
<Table 2·3> Regulatory Reforms Before and After the Roh Administration

Period

Total

Mitigated / simplified

Decentralized / delegated

Contracted out to private sector

Total

2,482

462

1,504

516

Prior to Roh admin. (1987)

1,515

(39 a year)

N/A

1,134

(29 a year)

381

(10 a year)

After Roh admin. (1988-1992)

967

(122 a year)

462

(154 a year)

370

(123 a year)

135

(45 a year)

Source: quoted in Kim Jeongsoo, “Deregulation in Korea: History and Assessment,” Deregulation, founding issue, September 1992: 81.

 
Despite strenuous efforts for deregulation made by the Roh administration, the most restrictive forms of regulatory measures, concerning authorization and licensing, still remained largely intact, raising doubts as to the substance of the deregulatory efforts.[8] In other words, the actual effect of the deregulation drive was limited because the administrative bodies focused on the quantity or outward appearance of deregulations over the quality. The issues and problems requiring regulatory reforms were given only cursory reviews and were not accompanied by the necessary follow-up actions, such as revisions or amendments to specific legal provisions, rules and standard operating procedures, or the release of notifications, public announcements, or administrative orders. The majority of the civil service at the point of contact with civilians remained hopelessly out of the reach of administrative deregulation. The regulatory reforms attempted under the Roh administration are symptomatic of the early phase of regulatory reform: concerned more with form than with substance.

 

The people’s interest in social regulation grew at an explosive pace amid a wave of political and social democratization under the Roh administration. There was strong social consensus on the need to strengthen regulatory measures protecting the quality of life, consumers, and industrial safety. In reality, however, the Roh era was spent mostly on recognizing and articulating the need for these social regulatory measures rather than on cultivating the substantial and practical debates required to see them realized. Even the social regulatory measures that did materialize were introduced by the government rather than by civil society or citizens. As a result, these regulations came to be perceived as burdensome on the economy, lacking nuanced and careful consideration of the economic ripple effects and fairness-enhancing outcomes that regulations were expected to achieve. The Roh administration, in particular, was more successful in rationalizing and streamlining individual government regulations than in giving rise to a new legal-institutional framework more consistent with the newly emerging socioeconomic order.[9]

 
[1] Ahn, 2002: 8-9.
[2] It appears that corruption always follows regulation. The human desire to overcome government regulation at the minimum cost possible will remain universal, especially in the absence of an effective system for prohibiting such behavior.
[3] Kim Yong-woo, “Progress of Regulatory Reforms in the Korean Government and Future Tasks,” Korean Journal of Policymaking Science, 1998, vol. 4, no. 2: 57-94.
[4] Kim, 1992: 74-75.
[5] Kim, 1992: 76-79.
[6] Kim, 1998: 58.
[7] Kim, 1992: 81-82.
[8] According to a survey by the Commission for Inquiring into the Factors Impeding Growth and Development in 1981, requests for authorization and licensing (1,877) and business registration and reports (1,307) together made up 3,194 of the 4,801 services administered by the civil service.
[9] Choi, 2003: 813-821.


Source: Korea Institute of Public Administration. 2008. Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.
 

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First Phase of Regulatory Reforms: Quantitative Reduction of Regulatory Measures
 
1. Regulatory Reforms under the Kim Youngsam Administration (February 1993 to February 1998)
 
(1) Overview of Regulatory Reforms under the Kim Youngsam Administration
Regulatory reforms were an integral part of the economic and administrative changes pursued by the Kim Youngsam administration, and were aimed at eliminating the cozy relationship between politics and corporations that had become the norm under the preceding authoritarian governments. In particular, the Kim administration sought to respond to the march of globalization and market liberalization worldwide set off by the launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. The failure of the market and the new economic policy, however, ultimately culminated in the foreign exchange crisis of 1997.[1]

 

Deregulation was a key objective of the Kim administration, as it sought to prepare for increasing globalization and the upcoming age of unlimited competition. Under the slogan, “With the Participation and Creativity of All Economic Actors,” the Kim administration established a long-term policy for a “new economy,” and pushed ahead with regulatory reforms systematically, with the intent of finding new driving forces for Korea’s continued economic development.

 

The Kim administration’s regulatory reform strategy followed two tracks: one was to eliminate or lower economic regulations, including those concerning market entry and pricing; the other was to reinforce, relatively speaking, social regulations pertaining to the protection of people’s livelihoods, including industrial safety and healthcare. This ambitious plan to eliminate and reform the innumerable regulations accumulated under the preceding authoritarian administrations was devised without systemic and diverse research or adequate time given to careful review and planning. The deregulation drive thus became a main subject of political controversy. This was especially evident in the countless revisions and distortions, made under growing political pressure, to the Kim administration’s original plan to revitalize all industries in Korea, including the commonwealth industries, by privatizing public or national assets.
 
(2) System of Implementing Regulatory Reforms under the Kim Youngsam Administration
A major feature of the regulatory reforms attempted by the Kim administration was the pluralization of implementing organizations, as the administration created new reform agencies in various ministries and departments. The Kim administration sought to outgrow the mold of fragmentary and sporadic reforms set by its predecessors by attempting a comprehensive review of all existing administrative regulations. The administration, moreover, adopted specialized and scientific techniques for pursuing reforms, including the Regulatory Impact Analysis Act, from other countries with a view to completing a far-reaching and well-organized regulatory reform system. Various ministries and departments sought to rise to this vision of the new administration by setting up their own reform agencies. However this, though perhaps well intentioned, actually increased the complexity of the regulatory reform implementation system[2] and pointed to the failure of the administration to set up an overarching, official institution for implementing reforms.


Starting with the Committee for Economic Deregulation in March 1993, the Economic Planning Board under the Kim administration went on to create three more regulatory reform committees, including the Committee for Administrative Reform, the Council for Deregulating Corporate Activities, and the Joint Council on Administrative Regulations. The system of implementing regulatory reforms under the Kim administration included both public and private elements. The committees and agencies formed during this period also tended to serve specific projects or purposes only, and lasted only temporarily for fixed terms (Table 2-4).

 

Furthermore, the organization for office work administration that oversaw regulatory reforms was not an independent governmental body in its own right but consisted of different ministries and departments managing a given project or committee at a time. The organization was mostly made up of government employees dispatched from those ministries and departments on a temporary basis. Nevertheless, this plural system of reforms was effective in its early days, contributing to the systematization of regulatory reforms with the passage of the Special Measures on Corporate Activities Regulation Act and the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations and Civil Affairs.[3]
 
<Table 2-4> Agencies Carrying out Regulatory Reforms under the Kim Youngsam Administration

Organization Establishment Reported to Subject of concern
Committee for Administrative Reform April 1993 President Administrative regulations
Joint Council on Administrative Regulations May 1994 Ministry of Government Administration Pre-regulation screening
Committee for Economic Regulatory Reformation April 1997 FTC Economic regulations
Committee for Corporate Regulation Review August 1993 Ministry of Commerce and Industry Economic regulations
Conference for Implementing Regulatory Reforms April 1997 President Administrative and economic regulations

 
Korea Economic Institute researchers Lee Juseon and Han Seonok analyzed the performance of each regulatory committee under the Kim administration. Their research revealed that the work of government-led committees, i.e., the Committee for Administrative Reform and the Committee for Economic Deregulation, concerned relatively insignificant matters (e.g., public announcements, rules, guidelines, and other administrative orders), while the work of civilian-led committees, i.e., the Committee for Corporate Regulation Review and the Conference for Implementing Regulatory Reforms, actually translated into substantive statutory developments and amendments.[4]
 
1) Committee for Administrative Reform (CAR)
The CAR, standing at the forefront of the Kim administration’s drive for regulatory reforms, was organized as a presidential advisory council in April 1993 under Presidential Decree 13878. The purpose of the Committee was to enhance the competitiveness of the national economy and the quality of life for the Korean people by eliminating the undemocratic administrative systems, practices, and ethos of the authoritarian past. All the members on the Committee, including its chair, were civilians who actively discussed ways to counter and reform the inefficient regulations of past governments. The CAR played a pivotal role in instigating bottom-up regulatory reforms nationwide.[5]
 
2) Joint Council for Administrative Regulations (JCAR)
The JCAR was first established as a part of the Ministry of Government Administration in May 1994 under the Framework Act on Administrative Regulations and Civil Affairs, and later became subject to the Administrative Regulation Management Act in August 1997. The JCAR was set up to conduct pre-regulation screening and review before a regulation came into being. The JCAR provides evidence that it was the Kim administration that established a basic management system for regulatory reforms. It was through the JCAR that the Kim administration was able to control and restrain the multiplication of regulations proactively, by mandating pre-regulation review and screening at each ministry or department, and requiring ministries and departments to hear the opinions of diverse interest groups before implementing regulatory measures. Yet not all new regulations were subjected to the JCAR’s review power, which was confined to regulations that raised interdepartmental controversies or that required special efforts for coordination.
 
3) Committee for Economic Regulatory Reformation (CERR)
The CERR came into being when the Committee for Economic Deregulation, which previously reported to the Ministry of Finance and Economy, was reorganized in April 1997 as a body reporting to the Fair Trade Commission (FTC). The CERR was responsible for reviewing important matters germane to policy measures for regulatory reforms and implementation, drawing up and submitting policy proposals to the Conference for Implementing Regulatory Reforms. Although the CERR officially advised the Minister of Finance and Economy, its organization and operation were led more by the government than its more civilian-based counterparts, such as the CAR.[6]
 
4) Committee for Corporate Regulation Review (CCRR)
The CCRR came into being as a screening agency for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry under the Special Measures for the Deregulation of Corporate Activities, passed in August 1993. The CCRR screens and reviews administrative regulations that have been imposed on corporate activities; handles the difficulties and complaints of companies regarding regulatory measures; makes policy suggestions and recommendations for improving corporate regulation institutions; evaluates and analyzes deregulatory measures concerning corporate activities; and surveys foreign laws, regulations, and case studies.
 
5) Conference for Implementing Regulatory Reforms (CIRR)
The CIRR, co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a civilian, represents public-private partnership on the deregulation drive, and came into being through the merging of CAR with CERR. Placed under the direct supervision of the President, the CIRR became the centerpiece of the Kim administration’s campaign for regulatory reforms. The Conference was organized in response to criticisms that regulatory reforms until then had focused on relatively minor matters, such as the simplification of administrative procedures, without paying due attention to core regulations that interfered with economic activities.[7] Upon the creation of the CIRR, the declaratory and ex-post-facto Framework Act on Administrative Regulations and Civil Laws was repealed and the system of implementing regulatory reforms became unified under the CIRR, now an organization with legal authority. The new Framework Act on Administrative Regulations was passed in place of the repealed law in August 1997. The new Framework Act upheld the principles of law-based regulations enshrined in the earlier law, while also requiring the registration and promulgation of regulatory measures; pre-screening of new regulations; assessment of the impact of new regulations as part of pre-screening; indication of the term during which a given regulatory authority has legal authority; review of existing regulations; establishment of general plans for reviewing regulations; and cooperation from related ministries and departments on the budget and organization for reviewing regulations.[8]
 
 

(3) Assessment of the Regulatory Reforms under the Kim Youngsam Administration
The Kim administration made a series of efforts to manage changes ushered in by globalization by laying down the cornerstone for regulatory reforms and deregulation, including the laws and institutions necessary for continuing with these reforms under subsequent administrations.[9] The sunset clause for regulatory reforms, the Regulatory Impact Analysis Act, and the principles of law-based regulations all gained institutional and systematic support toward the last years of the Kim administration. Nevertheless, the proliferation of reform agencies was responsible for the inefficiency, lack of consistency, and empire-building behavior of ministries and departments throughout the process of reform, revealing the fundamental limitations of the implementing organization. Various ministries and departments of the Kim administration competed against one another in pushing ahead with regulatory reforms by setting up their own implementing organizations. While the competition did revitalize the zeal of the administration and its various sections for reform, the overlapping jurisdictions, the absence of strong leadership, and the increasing complexity of the reform process also made it difficult to implement key reforms.[10] Although the Kim administration, in its later days, sought to create a unified implementing system and enhance the participation of civilians in governmental reform bodies, the changes introduced were in name only, having no substantial effect on boosting the administration’s competence in regulatory reforms.[11]

 
[1] Choi, 2004: 72.
[2] Yoo: 38-39.
[3] Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Comprehensive Review of Regulatory Reforms: A Roadmap for Regulatory Reforms for Achieving a Market Economy and Enhancing the Competitiveness of the Nation, 2007: 98-100.
[4] Lee Juseon and Han Seonok, Assessment of the Effects of Deregulation under the Kim Youngsam Administration, Korea Economic Research Institute, 1999: 92-115.
[5] Ahn, 2002: 14-15.
[6] Ahn, 2002: 15.
[7] Choi, 2004: 89.
[8] KERI and FKI, 2007: 98-100.
[9] KERI and FKI, 2007: 98-100.
[10] Yoo, 2002: 44-45.
[11] KERI and FKI, 2007: 98-100.


Source: Korea Institute of Public Administration. 2008. Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.